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The democracy dichotomy: framing the Hong Kong 2019 street protests as legitimacy 









This article evaluates the 2019 street protests in Hong Kong following the proposal of the 
Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation 
(Amendment) Bill 2019, in light of the constitutional settlement of the region. Firstly it 
examines the “constitutional morality” of Hong Kong, or the moral principles underlying its 
foundational claims to moral authority. Secondly it analyses whether the administration’s 
“legitimacy claims” – its rational-normative arguments for obedience to law – follow from 
these constitutional moral principles. Concluding that the legitimacy claims of the 
administration pursuant to the Bill proved morally unintelligible, this research finds that 
protest action by citizens was a logical and rational response to a perceived legitimacy claim 
failure. It suggests that similar protests are likely to occur for the foreseeable future given the 
instability of the region’s constitutional morality.  
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I. Introduction 
This article focuses on the constitutional logics underlying the street protests in Hong Kong 
after the proposal of the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 
Legislation (Amendment) Bill 2019 (“the Bill”).
1
 Specifically it examines the claims to 
legitimacy the Executive presented with regard to the Bill, in the context of liberal theory, in 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“Hong Kong”). It does so by presenting and 
combining two new conceptualisations of core components of liberal theory. The first is 
“constitutional morality,” the set of moral principles to which liberal regimes make claim. 
The second is the “legitimacy claim,” the normative argument posited by regimes through 
which, by acting in keeping with those principles of constitutional morality, their laws can 
claim moral legitimacy. This allows these legitimate laws to be capable of being obeyed by 
rational, morally autonomous subjects. This in turn can be contrasted with the “legitimacy 
counterclaims” made by protesters if they find the regime’s legitimacy claims incoherent or 
deficient. Using these normative logics, it can be demonstrated that the Bill was inconsistent 
with the moral principles from which the administration of Hong Kong derives its claims to 
moral authority.  
 
In what follows, I give a brief synopsis of the historical background and events 
leading to the street protests. Then, I explore the concept of constitutional morality with 
relation to liberal regimes. I critically examine Hong Kong’s constitutional morality and find 
that it suffers from irreconcilable incoherence, as it draws from both liberal and democratic 
principles whilst failing to enshrine them fully. After that, I present legitimacy claims as a 
																																																													
1
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means of framing claims to those moral principles in pursuit of obedience from subjects. I 
frame the Bill using these logics and subject it to rational-normative critique, or moral 
reasoning, based on the liberal and democratic principles to which the administration of Hong 
Kong appeals in its legitimacy claims. The Bill will be seen as an example of a law founded 
upon an incoherent legitimacy claim. Consequently, the protest actions will be framed as 
legitimacy counterclaims against a Bill that had deviated from core constitutional moral 
principles espoused by Hong Kong, per a liberal regime. To the extent that obedience to that 
law would be normatively irrational for citizens, protest and resistance are morally 
permissible and rational responses to its proposal. 
 
 Most importantly, it will further be concluded that, beyond the particular instance of 
the anti-Bill protests, the moral constitutional logics of Hong Kong are insufficiently coherent 
to support consistent legitimacy claims under liberal constitutional logics. Until democracy is 
fully enshrined in the constitutional settlement, these incoherent claims to democratic 
legitimacy will continue to give cause for dissent. In short, it can be shown that as a matter of 
moral reasoning, such protests are not only justifiable but inevitable. Consequently, one can 
expect that future laws which show similar inconsistency in their claims to liberal-democratic 
legitimacy will give good moral reason for dissent.  
 
 
II. Theoretical framework 
This research principally uses the methodology of rational-normative logic, or moral 
reasoning, to test the coherence and consistency of moral claims.
2
 Specifically, the test of 
normative rationality will be framed using the newly-conceptualised legitimacy claim 
heuristic, which tests whether a regime’s claims for obedience follow logically from its 
constitutional moral principles. It presumes that there are “moral reasons for action,” “moral 
principles,” or “grounds of obligation” – the terms are often used interchangeably – which are 
moral reasons for action and axiological to moral argument.
3
 Governments – including that of 
Hong Kong – often cite justice, equality, human rights and liberty as numbering amongst 
their legitimating constitutional moral principles, as shall be discussed in the next section.
4
 
After positing such moral axioms, regimes create a chain of rational argument, which creates 




A slightly altered approach must be taken when testing the legitimacy counterclaims 
made by protesters, although it relies upon an analogous analytic process. Unlike 
governments, protesters do not make claims to de facto authority or sovereignty: however, 
when engaging in protests they do make claims to the moral consistency and logic of their 
own claims.
6
 These claims may also be based on moral grounds similar to the state’s 
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constitutional moral principles. The legitimacy of the protest counterclaims will not however 
be the central focus of this research.  
 
 The theoretical approach of this research claims neither a positivist nor a non-
positivist theoretical framework to law and legal validity.
7
 This is justifiable given that the 
research is not, and need not be, an examination of the vast positivist, non-positivist or 
natural law literature that already exists.
8
 The research focuses on moral logics of obedience, 
that is, whether moral obligations of obedience or disobedience apply to seemingly immoral 
laws. This is a separate question to whether a purportedly immoral law is legally valid.
9
 This 
in turn informs the judgement of whether protest action is internally coherent with the state’s 
own purported moral axioms, as will be demonstrated in the specific example of the Hong 
Kong 2019 protests in this case. 
 
 
III. Historical Background 
The following is by necessity a brief historical background upon which to build this analysis. 
It is however hoped that for those unfamiliar with the constitutional background of Hong 
Kong, and of these protests in particular, it will prove a helpful synopsis for the purpose of 
framing the following discussion.   
 
Since handover from British colonial rule in 1997, Hong Kong has been a Special 
Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). Under its Basic Law, 
Hong Kong enjoys certain constitutional provisions typical of a liberal regime, including 
protections for human rights, and areas of administrative autonomy reserved for self-
governance, including its postcolonial common law legal system. It has one of the greatest 
levels of autonomy of any non-sovereign administrative region in the world.
10
 It does 
however lack equal, universal suffrage in elections for the Chief Executive, and there are 
long-standing concerns about the influence of Beijing over the Executive branch of 
government, and any future progress the region may have for democratisation.
11
 In this way, 
Hong Kong finds itself in a struggle between its colonial past, the political power of the PRC, 
and its own identity as a unique regime with liberal-democratic aspirations.  
 
Following worries that there were discrepancies in the ability to extradite fugitives to 
other regions in the PRC, including Taiwan, in February 2019 the government of Hong Kong 
proposed changes to its extradition laws. It sought a mechanism for the Hong Kong Chief 
Executive to transfer fugitives to any jurisdiction with which the city lacked an existing 
extradition arrangement, purportedly to end any "legal loophole" – this was to be achieved 
through the proposed Bill.
12
 For thousands of Hong Kong residents, the perceived 
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involvement of Beijing in those drafting processes, the lack of democratic mandate for the 
law, and the potential for such extraditions to undermine local human rights protections for 




The first protests occurred on 31 March, with approximately 12,000 protesters 
(according to organisers, the Civil Human Rights Front) demanding the withdrawal of the 
Bill.
14
 Throughout April, the movement gained numbers as approximately 130,000 protesters 
joined demonstrations. Tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, would gather in 
subsequent marches in May and June.
15
 During these subsequent months, protesters began to 
make demands beyond withdrawal of the Bill, including amnesty for arrested protesters, an 
independent inquiry into alleged police brutality, and implementation of complete universal 
suffrage, which is lacking under the current Basic Law. It is also during this time that actions 
beyond peaceful protest, including vandalism of government property and skirmishes with 




With this background in mind, the following section will now focus on the theoretical 
underpinnings of claims to liberal governance. It begins with general principles of 
constitutionality and morality common to any purportedly liberal regime, and not only to 
Hong Kong. However, it will then examine the constitutional framework of Hong Kong 
specifically, including its unique constitutional morality, and will then frame the anti-Bill 
protests accordingly.  
 
 
IV. Constitutional Morality and Democracy 
Liberal theory suffers from what Dworkin called the “paradox of civil society.”
17
 This is the 
dilemma of how a liberal state justifies coercion against subjects who are purportedly morally 
autonomous.
18
 The ability to make decisions based upon one’s own evaluation of moral 
principles and considerations, or “practical reason,” requires citizens to consider their moral 
principles and act in accordance with them.
19
 Yet the coercive nature of government, and law 
in particular, requires us to bend our wills to that of the law, at times contrary to our 
autonomous moral rationality.
20
 Part of the entire appeal of liberal regimes, fundamental to 
their internal logics, is that they preserve the autonomy of citizens as moral agents. At the 
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same time, the regime must be able to coordinate behaviour according to law, often in 





There are several theories which attempt to resolve this. Some take a social 
contractarian, or consent-based approach, where the citizen’s voluntary participation in the 
political life of the state waives their moral claims to autonomy and disobedience.
22
 Other 
theories are founded on fairness, or the need for citizens to accept equal concern and 
participation including reciprocal expectations of obedience.
23
 These are all moral arguments 
regarding political obligation, whatever the theoretical source of that obligation may be.
24
 
Most usefully for current purposes, there are other arguments which use rational-normative 
moral logics in order to justify obedience to law as being legitimate, despite the moral 
autonomy of subjects, in certain circumstances.
25
 More will be said of these challenges in the 
next section, regarding claims to legitimacy within the framework of the law and its coercive 
powers. It can be observed for current purposes, however, that liberal regimes make moral 
claims to justify coercion. They do so by appealing to specific moral principles as grounds of 
political obligation, in justification of their constitutional morality. It will now be useful to 
explore briefly the concept of “constitutional morality,” and its wider meaning in liberal 
theory, before turning to its specific pertinence to the difficulties in Hong Kong. 
 
A. Moral grounds and constitutional morality  
One must look to an entirely different liberal regime in order to find the root of this particular 
conception of “constitutional morality.” For the purposes of this article, the phrase has been 
adapted from Ambedkar’s discussion during Constituent Assembly debates. As the Indian 
Constitution began to take shape after British colonial rule, a number of difficulties beyond 
the mere text of the Constitution were addressed.
26
 Ambedkar claimed that in order for the 
Constitution to succeed in its purpose, certain moral principles would have to inform a wider 
democratic constitutional culture so as to counterbalance the postcolonial, caste-based society 
on which the Constitution was, as he considered it, being superimposed.
27
 Such principles 
would include equality of citizens, faith in the rule of law, and a principle of constitutional 
democracy beyond merely formal democratic institutions and governance. Béteille explored 
how Ambedkar was concerned that there should be the extra-textual, cultural and moral 




Raz describes this conceptualisation as the “thick” sense of constitutionalism: a 
normative culture and normative rationality founded in constitutional moral principles 
beyond the mere text of a written constitutional document.
29
 The legitimacy of the 
constitutional settlement fundamentally depends upon such moral principles. For an emerging 
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postcolonial liberal democracy, according to Ambedkar, absence of a culture and morality of 
liberal democracy might jeopardise faith in the new constitution.
30
 Again, these moral 
principles are not standards for legal validity within the constitutional settlement. 
Nevertheless, they are imperative if the constitutional order is to be perceived as legitimate, 





“Constitutional morality,” as a term of art, is not used consistently across the vast 
literature on liberal constitutionalism. In United States jurisprudence the phrase has been 
burdened with a highly specific meaning with relation to originalism in adjudication.
32
 Other 
theorists address the core concept either in different terminologies, or in an abstracted manner 
that does not provide the concept with a specific moniker. For example, Dworkin considers 
constitutional morality as the body of principles of political morality that define the political 
community and give justification to its laws.
33
 On the other hand, Raz considers it to be the 
corpus of “moral principles” which give constitutions and their legal systems normative 
effect “as long as they remain within the boundaries set by [those moral principles].”
34
 For 
Lyons, these principles may be considered to be “moral presumptions” which form the 
starting points for arguments for or against obedience to law.
35
 These principles go by so 
many different and often overlapping names: grounds of political obligation,
36
 moral reasons 
for action,
37
 or grounds of moral obligation.
38
 Regardless the nomenclature, they ground the 
constitutional order with the legitimacy necessary to make reasonable claims for obedience 
from morally autonomous citizens.  
 
This constitutional morality should not be mistaken for an attempt by individual 
citizens to impose their own moral principles in interpretation of the constitutional settlement. 
Within the state’s own constitutional regime, one can ascertain its political morality as “the 
full set of moral considerations that inform judgments of justice and legitimacy.”
39
 To make 
compelling claims to morally autonomous subjects, a constitution must make appeal to 
recognized political and moral values.
40
 This means that, although different political 
communities enjoy a different variety of principles and values, any given regime’s claims to 
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Sources of constitutional morality – that is, where one might find evidence of the 
existence of certain moral constitutional principles – will depend upon the state in question 
but might include constitutional documents, academic opinion, case law and precedent, 
legislative debate, and particular legislation that refers to or incorporates these moral 
principles.
41
 The advantage of using these sources to discover these moral principles is that 
the state, or the proponents of the liberal order in question, will posit them in claims for 
obedience. This is useful for identifying the regime’s claims to legitimacy, as it is evident 




Some moral principles appear almost universally across self-proclaimed liberal 
regimes. “Justice” is a classic example. There are countless sources in which one can observe 
claims to this moral principle: Ministries of Justice, “justice” as a euphemism for law 
enforcement, the names of criminal justice statutes, of prisons, of all manner of state-
mandated laws and practices in pursuit of law-enforcement, and countless other examples 
besides. These can be found in every liberal regime, democratic or otherwise. All of this 
discourse and practice depends upon a claim to legitimacy founded on the principle of justice 
as a moral reason for action it itself. It is a justification for state interference with the liberty 
of citizens, beyond mere law-enforcement.
43
 It would be farfetched to claim that a state could 
make reasonable claims to obedience of morally autonomous agents, as a liberal regime, if it 
only made claims to law enforcement, and not to justice, when interfering with this very 
moral autonomy. One might say that the absence of a clear claim to justice would render such 
a state’s constitutional settlement unintelligible as a liberal polity, bereft of the moral 




A different constitutional principle, of definitive value to a self-proclaimed liberal 
state, is (at least some formal) equality amongst citizens as political participants.
45
 The 
fundamental importance of equality in justifying the coercive nature of political life under a 
liberal regime, certainly inasmuch as all citizens should have some participatory rights, is 
found consistently across the literature.
46
 For liberal theory to resolve the paradox of civil 
society, it needs a relative moral parity of value between citizens. Democracy in particular 
requires equal rights of participation to claim legitimacy as a means of solving collective 
problems and coordinating behaviour.
47
 It is almost impossible to imagine a democracy that 
would not proudly claim – if not always secure in reality – a formal, civil and political, 
equality among its demos, however composed. It is a separate question altogether whether 
such claims are realized fully, or if they might also include substantive rights, in any given 
liberal regime. Importantly, for liberal theory to make any coherent claim to legitimacy, it 





Some states may espouse different variations of moral principles, or interpret and 
apply them in different ways.
49
 Regional variations exist in how such principles apply in 
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liberal regimes, across such various countries as the UK, Germany, Kenya, the USA, and 
India.
50
 Even so, the governments of each of these states make claims to moral principles to 
legitimize their authority and the obedience of their citizens.
51
 Their moral grounds differ but 















 and human rights.
59
 It is not the purpose of this research to investigate 
these concepts or their definitions, nor is it necessary to ask whether such moral principles 
exist absolutely, universally or objectively.
60
 It is sufficient to show that proponents of liberal 
theory, and the regimes that rely upon its logics to legitimate their rule, including Hong 
Kong, do make claim to posited moral grounds for legitimacy and therefore obedience. If 
they did not, their claims to moral authority would be unintelligible.
61
 Claims relating to the 
justifiability of the regime’s coercive powers are only morally intelligible if they are in 




To counter accusations that this approach relies upon dubious historiography, it 
should be noted that whether states are historically “founded” upon stated moral grounds is of 
little importance. That a state may not be so founded would not prevent a rational-normative 
evaluation of its constitutional settlement and the moral principles to which it now makes 
claim.
63
 The UK constitution for example, to the extent that it has ever had a deliberately 
founded constitution or codified its constitutional development, has developed due to 
pragmatic or political motivations rather than due to constitutional-moral imperatives.
64
 
Likewise – and crucially for our purposes – the same democratic deficit and illiberalism 
pervaded the colonial history of Hong Kong.
65
 It is not however the historical foundation that 
is of importance to current moral argument, but the present constitutional settlement. All 
liberal regimes, inasmuch as they presently make claim to be such a regime, refer to moral 
principles in their claims to legitimate authority. These regimes overtly and deliberately use 
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Moral principles are seldom absolute or indefeasible, and rarely operate in isolation.
67
 
Our decisions as moral actors inevitably involve multiple moral imperatives, some of which 
appear to conflict in everyday life. These moral grounds act chiefly as reasons for action, to 
be balanced and contrasted with other relevant moral considerations.
68
 The same applies 
equally to constitutional morality. Each regime will make claim to, and seek to pursue, 
numerous countervailing moral claims: at times prioritizing fairness over justice, or the rule 
of law over individual liberty, and so forth.
69
 This is a difficult balance to strike. But this does 
not necessarily make the state’s constitutional morality unintelligible, nor justify our 
abandoning the project of constitutional morality wholesale. Rather, if anything it compels us 
to consider seriously the moral claims which give reason to political life, and to strive harder 




That the terms of these moral principles are inherently contestable may in fact be an 
asset to, rather than a burden upon, liberal theory. Debating the meanings of justice, 
democracy, fairness and equality is itself a core function of both liberal and democratic 
practice. Argument over the scope and content of moral principles is a part of the 
development of a robust liberal regime.
71
 Equality, for example, does not have to be an 
uncontestable term to be a meaningful social concept, and one to which appeals are evidently 
made in the course of social and political life. Such moral principles will forever be subject to 
agonistic philosophical and political debate, but this does not bar their coherent use within 
moral discourse, and therefore in constitutional theory.  
 
It is clear that liberal states must make claims to moral principles as the basis of their 
constitutional order, and therefore their claims to obedience.
72
 It is demonstrable that they do 
in fact make these appeals to moral grounds which, though subject to variation and 
contestable definition, are identifiable within sources of constitutional morality. The laws and 
policies of the state are only intelligible if they flow consistently from these principles: this is 
what constitutional morality in effect demands.
73
 It is now possible to examine the 
constitutional morality of Hong Kong under this framework, and identify the core difficulties 
in establishing its axiological foundations.  
 
 
B. The dichotomous constitutional morality of Hong Kong 
It can be demonstrated that there is an innate incoherence in the constitutional moral 
principles embodied in the constitutional settlement – indeed, plural settlements – of Hong 
Kong.  
 
The first observation is that Hong Kong is not itself a sovereign state but a Special 
Administrative Region of the PRC, and one might argue that taking this liberal (and 
predominantly, democratic) state model to analyse Hong Kong’s constitutional settlement 
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would be misplaced and perhaps even unacceptably Eurocentric.
74
 One might therefore take 
the view that the foregoing state-centric liberal theories simply do not apply to Hong Kong. A 
response to this may well be to agree: with the caveat that, this being so, Hong Kong cannot 
make coherent claims to the same liberal or democratic justifications for obedience, and so 





This paper however proceeds on an alternative response. Hong Kong does have 
sufficient (if highly contingent) autonomy, and (as shall be demonstrated presently) makes 
sufficient appeals to these Western liberal and democratic principles that, for the purposes of 
governance, it operates as the immediate autonomous government of the area, and makes 
claims to obedience to its laws similar to those of a liberal democratic regime.
76
 With 
autonomy over currency, border control, economic policy, criminal justice and many other 
policies except for military defence and centralised foreign policy, Hong Kong has autonomy 
almost unheard of in any other administrative region in the world.
77
 As a regime, it therefore 
operates in the immediate place of the “state” in the dynamics of constitutional morality and 
legitimacy claims.
78
 That Hong Kong is not itself a sovereign state is nonetheless highly 
significant, as will be made clear presently.  
 
With regard first to constitutional morality, then, a clear incoherence exists in a) the 
constitutional settlement of Hong Kong itself, and b) the moral principles embodied therein.  
 
 On the first point, the paradoxes of the Basic Law and its creation have been the 
subject of much attention since well before its enactment.
79
 The Basic Law is an almost 
unique constitutional document in not being a “constitution” in a traditional Western sense.
80
 
It is a “basic law” from the National People’s Congress of the PRC, and subject to the 




The compatibility of the Basic Law with the Constitution of the PRC was declared by 
an Interpretation of the NPCSC: to that extent one might argue that the Basic Law, as 
compatible and subordinate law, is ultimately subsumed by the Constitution of the PRC, and 
does not stand in juxtaposition to it as a separate constitutional settlement.
82
 There is 
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nonetheless a great deal of opinion to the contrary. The Basic Law does itself have “all the 
hallmarks of a constitution,” as it both defines the powers of various governmental organs, 
and enshrines certain civil and human rights.
83
 Considered to be the superior law of the 
jurisdiction, the Court of Final Appeal has described the Basic Law as both a national law, 
and as the only de facto and de jure constitution of Hong Kong.
84
 There are, therefore, clear 
contradictions to be reconciled within the “one country, two systems” hybrid governance 
dynamic with regard to the Basic Law. This constitutional settlement, though the only 
directly applicable constitutional settlement used by Hong Kong courts, operates with an 
autonomy entirely contingent upon the PRC’s own very distinct constitutional regime.
85
 
There remains as such a fundamental incoherence as to the source, or indeed sources, to 




Even presuming – as the Court of Final Appeal does – the local primacy of the Basic 
Law over the jurisdiction, the second difficulty with the constitutional morality of Hong 
Kong remains unresolved, namely the moral principles it embodies. At first glance, the Basic 
Law, as a source of constitutional moral principles, very clearly states moral principles of 
importance to Hong Kong as a liberal regime. The principle of democratic governance, for 
example, is explicitly stated as a principle within the Basic Law, with equal universal 
suffrage codified as a principle to which the region aspires, subject to the principle of gradual 
and orderly progress.
87
 This aspirational democratic principle is however a highly contested 
concept. Since its inception the democratic spirit of the Basic Law has been subject to 
scrutiny, particularly in the context of historical British colonial rule and its absence of 
democratic legitimacy. Some have described the “mirage” of Hong Kong’s democracy as 
being more rhetorical than substantive.
88
 Recently the difficulty of the Basic Law’s 
dependency on gradual democratic change, which has been stymied somewhat by NPC 
decisions with relation to changing the electoral processes for the Legislative Council and the 
Chief Executive, has led to greater concern that the promise of democracy has been 
continuously disappointed.
89
 Moreover, and most fundamentally, there is a dissonance 
between the stated regional constitutional morality of democratic legitimacy, and the 
fundamentally different approach to democracy adopted by the PRC.
90
 Where these explicit 
and unambiguous local claims to democratic legitimacy have been found wanting by Hong 
Kong residents before, particularly due to perceived resistance from the PRC and its 
institutions, it has created significant tensions amongst a frustrated public that accuses the 
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One can see similar difficulties with other constitutional moral principles enshrined in 
the Basic Law. For example, autonomy and self-determination are explicitly exalted 
throughout the document, especially with relation to Articles 5 and 8.
92
 Socially and 
politically, pride in the idiosyncratic, capitalist, metropolitan cultural identity of Hong Kong 
as a liberal regime informs this regional conceptualisation of autonomy. A wider principle of 
economic and political liberty underlies it, one might argue, which encapsulates the liberality 
of Hong Kong’s constitutional morality per liberal regime.
93
 One difficulty is that the term 
“autonomy” evades clear definition, both within the Basic Law itself and across the wider 
literature.
94
 Indeed, other provisions make clear that these principles exist in an 
uncomfortable tension, being inextricably linked with, and subject to, PRC constitutional 
legitimation and political power.
95
 The Chinese constitutional system is not federated, with 
regional autonomy being primary but for that which is federated to the national level: instead 
it is generally considered to be unitary, with central authority being primary but for that 
which is delegated to regions.
96
 The constitutional settlement of the Basic Law, and the 
autonomy it protects and enshrines, is ultimately granted by a national law. It is a subordinate 
autonomy.
97
 Other typically liberal constitutional moral principles proudly espoused by the 
Hong Kong regime, such as the rule of law and human rights, are of course subject to similar 




These internal paradoxes threaten the axiomatic coherence necessary for legitimacy 
claims to be effective – or at least, they do if one presumes that the Basic Law’s liberal 
democratic constitutional morality has parity with the Chinese constitutional morality. 
Conversely, some theorists have taken a very strong view on the subordination of liberal 
democratic norms within the Hong Kong system. Morris, for one, would say that the 
democratic and liberal principles enshrined – to the extent they are so enshrined – in the 
Basic Law, will always be aberrations of the PRC’s underlying constitutional morality.
99
 He 
argues that from a Kelsenian perspective, the Grundnorm – the fundamental normative fact 
that underlies all normative claims within a system – is to be found not in the Basic Law but 
in the Constitution of the PRC.
100
 This being so, one would have to say that in truth the Basic 
Law’s constitutional morality is alien to the fundamental Chinese constitutional morality and, 
being subordinate to it, should be removed or altered so as to be coherent with the latter. 
Alternatively, one can treat both normative systems as being equally applicable, but in 
conflict: in which case there is a moral cross-purpose in the moral axioms claimed to be in 
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 Notably, Benny Tai considers Hong Kong to have its own distinct constitutional 
existence, which should resist the “encroachment” of the hostile Mainland 
constitutionality.
102
 This creates other difficulties for the coherence of the legitimacy claims 




It therefore becomes difficult to establish which moral principles, from whichever 
constitutional settlement, truly determine the constitutional morality of Hong Kong. As we 
shall see, even if one presumes the constitutional primacy of the Basic Law in the region and 
its commitment to human rights, the rule of law, democratic development and regional 
autonomy under a liberal polity, this incoherence will directly impact the legitimacy claims of 
the regime regarding the Bill, and potentially many more laws in the future.  
 
The next section looks to the second stage of the argument for obedience: that is, that 
a regime’s claims to legitimacy purportedly follow from its starting moral axioms. Only once 
this is understood can one understand obedience, and therefore by contrast (should these 
moral claims fail) disobedience and protests in a purported liberal regime. We will then be 
able to see how legitimacy claims appear troublesome in the case of Hong Kong. 
 
 
V. Legitimacy claims  
Legitimacy is generally understood to mean a particular type of moral or political 
authority.
104
 Largely it signifies the moral authority of a state or regime to generate 
obligations on morally autonomous subjects, including obligations to obey laws.
105
 These are 
instances of “political obligations,” which arise without the consent of the citizen 
individually.
106
 If the state and its laws are deemed to be legitimate, than they have normative 
force notwithstanding the fact that the individual citizen may have reservations as to their 
content.
107
 Simply put, a good moral argument based on a good moral principle inspires an 
obligation in rational citizens to obey. If on the other hand a legitimacy deficit is perceived by 
these citizens, the same moral authority claimed by the state may not have full normative 
effect – that is to say, may not prove morally binding on its subjects. This can lead citizens to 
reject the law in question, to disobey or to protest, or even attempt to overthrow the 
government.  
 
One can apply moral logic to assess the internal coherence of states’ moral claims to 
authority, by reference to their fundamental moral principles and norms.
108
 One begins with a 
moral reason for action, or the moral principle to which an appeal is made, such as fairness, 
found in the regime’s constitutional morality. This is the axiom in the moral reasoning: the 
premise upon which the moral reasoning is based. Subsequent argument must remain 
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consistent with that principle in order to be intelligible and coherent. If for example one treats 
as axiomatic the equality of human persons, a law or policy of discriminatory segregation 
would be inconsistent with the axioms posited. Analogous reasoning was used to justify civil 
disobedience during the Civil Rights movement, and in Black Lives Matter protests in recent 
years.
109
 Provided that the argument remains internally consistent, and the actions of the state 
remain coherent with its legitimating constitutional principles, the rational-normative logic 




A. Overview of the legitimacy claims heuristic 
Given that claims to legitimate authority depend upon contestable moral axioms, and that no 
law or society can be expected to attain absolute conditions of perfect equality, democracy, 
justice or fairness – and therefore, perfect legitimacy – the most that can realistically be 
expected is for states to demonstrate the “legitimation-worthiness” of their claims.
111
 The 
“legitimacy claims” of governments will essentially be normative arguments, using 
constitutional moral principles as axioms, and demonstrating that their laws and policies are 
coherent with those axioms.
112
 Sultany, from whose work the term is derived, presents the 
phrase ”legitimacy claim” in Law and Revolution, but uses this language less as a term of art 
than as a broader description of state attempts to make a claim for obedience generally. It is 
now suggested that as a rational-normative heuristic, “legitimacy claims” should be 
understood as a framework for conceptualising the logical order of claims to legitimacy. For 
the purpose of this paper, I define a legitimacy claim as a claim made by a state relating to its 
moral authority to impose obligations on morally autonomous subjects without their consent.  
 
One or more moral constitutional principles are presented as axiomatic, and the state 
presents an argument for obedience as a normatively defensible, rational behaviour on the 
part of a morally autonomous subject because the legitimacy claim is consistent and appeals 
to a suitable moral principle.
113
 A legitimacy claim therefore comprises three components: 
firstly, a constitutional moral axiom to which the state makes claim; secondly, a posited law 
that purports to be consistent with the aims of that moral axiom; and thirdly, a requirement of 
obedience should the law be consistent with the moral axiom as a reason for action.  
 
Moral principles, and their applicability as reasons for action, will vary between 
subjects and contexts, but a regime’s claims to moral authority are only ever intelligible if 
they are in pursuit of aims consistent with the moral principles included within that regime’s 
constitutional morality.
114
 One should examine the coherence of the claims made by states – 
accepting their moral grounds as reasons for action prima facie but instead questioning the 
coherence and consistency of their calls for obedience to laws made under those moral 
principles. When interrogating the rigour of state claims to authority, we pass over the 
existential problem of moral relativism regarding principles, and instead can focus on the 
merits of the state’s claims with reference to its own stated principles.
115
 The internal 
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consistency of the moral argument is the main focus of examination. The rational-normative 
concept of legitimacy explains why morally autonomous subjects would be obligated to 
follow state laws, but without defined moral principles being recognised as authoritative, 
there would be unacceptable moral subjectivity regarding the moral grounds which would 
render a law legitimate or illegitimate.
116
 However, by framing claims to authority as 
“legitimacy claims,” based on already-posited moral principles, one tests these claims to 
obedience by the constitutional morality posited by the state, holding it to its own moral 
standards.  
 
This method of assessing the legitimacy-worthiness of state claims, by holding their 
laws to the moral standards used for their legitimation, reflects discourses across protest 
movements in sociological literature.
117
 Protest movements frequently cite moral principles 
raised by the regime itself and espoused by the wider political community, and highlight 
inconsistencies in regime claims for obedience in problematic laws. The Civil Rights 
movement is a strong example of this in action: the United States constitutional claims to 
legitimacy, famously founded upon the principle that all men are created equal, was found 




Protest might be conceptualised as a response to incoherent state legitimacy claims, 
and as a non-institutionalised forum of redress for these failures.
119
 In this way, protest can be 
framed as a claim to those very moral grounds posited by the state.
120
 It has been recognised 
that protest acts as a form of moral dialogue, in that it facilitates the exchange of moral 
arguments between citizens and state.
121
 Protest movements can and do consider claims to 
legitimacy using such rational-normative logics. Further, protest can itself acts as a 
legitimacy counterclaim. This means it can present both a critique of the state’s moral 
reasoning, and an argument that the protest itself is morally rational and justified on the same 




The foregoing sections, though general in nature and not specific to Hong Kong, are 
crucial if one is to understand the crisis of constitutional morality underlying the political 
turbulence in Hong Kong in 2019. Only by understanding that liberal theory depends upon 
coherent constitutional morality, and consistent legitimacy claims to those moral principles in 
state law and policy, can one understand that Hong Kong suffers from a constitutional 
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B. Hong Kong’s legitimacy claim dissonance 
Hong Kong’s aforementioned incoherence in constitutional morality has direct impact on the 
coherence of its legitimacy claims, as can be evidenced not only in theoretical terms but also 
in the case of protests against the Bill. With relation to the 2019 protests, we see this 
legitimacy claim heuristic operate in practice.  
 
 The facts relating to the Bill’s contents and reception need not be restated here at 
great length.
123
 In short, the Bill proposed the introduction of a new special surrender 
arrangement so as to be rid of restrictions against extraditing suspects from Hong Kong to 
other regions of the PRC, thereby empowering the Chief Executive as the sole decision-
maker in determining case-based arrangements. This would be despite the other PRC regions 
having lower standards of human rights protections and rights of due process.
124
 Human 
rights groups and journalists also highlighted the potential chilling effect this could have on 
freedom of speech and journalistic independence within Hong Kong – concerns which were 
not allayed by the Executive during months of deliberations.
125
 As the Hong Kong Bar 
Association observed in April 2019: 
 
The concerns over the significant differences between the judicial and criminal justice 
systems practised in Hong Kong and the Mainland in terms of protection of 




For political opponents of the Bill, it was not simply that it proved unpopular on its 
substantive content: it was considered an aberration, incompatible with the human rights and 
liberal democratic legitimacy of Hong Kong. Amnesty International called it “the final straw” 
in a series of moves that have sought to undermine human rights protections in the region.
127
 
The Civil Human Rights Front, the group which helped organise key protests, was quoted by 
the Hong Kong Free Press as saying that approximately two million people attended protests 
in June 2019.
128
 Resistance to the Bill came precisely from the fact that it failed to meet the 
principles which residents of Hong Kong saw as fundamental to their governance.  
 
 As such, we see in action the precise manner in which the Bill presents as a failed 
legitimacy claim. Regarding constitutional-moral axioms, there was confusion as to the moral 
principles to which claim was made by the Executive. Before the Bill was shelved, Carrie 
Lam had emphasised that the Bill was not “made to measure” for Beijing – preserving the 
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principle of regional autonomy – and that it was justifiable on grounds of due process and 
justice, and in preservation of the rule of law in handling particular criminal cases.
129
 These 
are all direct appeals to the liberal principles of the Hong Kong regime. As such the 
axiological principles posited by the Executive were purportedly in keeping with the Hong 
Kong Basic Law and its regional, liberal constitutional morality, rather than that of the PRC.  
 
 However, it became clear that the coherence of the moral principles at play was far 
from established. For example, claims to autonomy made by the administration were 
questioned by many, given the realpolitik of Beijing’s influence over the Hong Kong 
administration.
130
 There has been widespread belief that the Bill was indeed pushed from 
Beijing, which would render that claim dubious at best.
131
 The other claimed principles of 
justice and due process, which seem central to the Basic Law and the regional constitutional 
morality, seemed defective in the Bill. It provided insufficient judicial oversight of an 
executive extradition decision, and could allow the safeguards of due process and human 
rights protections to be circumvented by executive action.
132
 As such, the posited reasons for 
the justifiability of the Bill were considered specious from the offset, and inconsistent with 
the liberal constitutional morality of the region. 
 
 Consequently, we can see the failure of the legitimacy claim itself. As a result of this 
axiological incoherence, the claim that the Bill was consistent with Hong Kong’s 
constitutional morality was widely rejected. It was considered an aberration, an alien 
imposition from the PRC, and inconsistent with the political morality of Hong Kong’s liberal 
regime.
133
 In short, the Bill gave no good reasons to be accepted and obeyed.  
 
 In the absence of a strong legitimacy claim, protests against the Bill were widespread 
– numbering hundreds of thousands, if not millions, over the course of many months – and 
were vocal about the illegitimacy of the proposed Bill.
134
 The dialogic nature of protest per 
counterclaim has been observed by political theorists for many years. Charles Tilly concluded 
during his analysis of political violence that collective protest is a “kind of conversation,” 
reflective of the socio-political context of the regime in question.
135
 More recently, Gilman-
Opalsky has theorised that even violent protest and riot are the vocalisations of a “philosophy 
from below.”
136
 For these liberal, pro-democracy protesters, disobedience and protest can 
themselves act as a dialogic response to the perceived legitimacy deficit of the Bill. 
 
 The counterclaims regarding justice, the rule of law and autonomy then spread to 
broader legitimacy counterclaims regarding the principles of democratic governance 
underlying the Bill. It became clear that the effect of the Bill, and its being pushed by the 
Chief Executive without a satisfactory democratic mandate, was also considered to be 
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inconsistent with the principles of liberal democratic governance that many considered 
necessary for the legitimate authority of the administration to operate.
137
 Its claim to 
obedience relied upon a practical conception of authority, that is, to the underlying illiberal, 
nondemocratic settlement and the political supremacy of the PRC: it could not support the 
legitimacy of the law on Hong Kong’s more liberal, democratic settlement, nor on the moral 
constitutionality underpinning it.
138
 As such the Bill presented a poor legitimacy claim 
regarding its democratic justifiability.  
 
 This is fundamentally how the protests outgrew the original, narrow contention over 
the Bill, and became a much wider counterclaim to a perceived legitimacy failure from the 
Chief Executive and the Hong Kong administration at large.
139
 The Bill’s legitimacy deficit 
proved itself to be based upon the more fundamental deficits in the administration’s 
legitimacy, derived from a lack of democratic mandate and the perceived subversive 
influence of the PRC. Protesters began to claim that the Bill was a mere side-effect of a more 
fundamental failure to effect the democratic constitutional moral principles enshrined in the 
Basic Law and Hong Kong’s regional constitutional morality. Legitimacy counterclaims were 
made regarding the overall democratic accountability within Hong Kong, similarly to how 
demands for greater democratic reform were made under the earlier Umbrella Movement.
140
 
This is important because it demonstrates that democracy, however defined and however 
nascent it may be, is sincerely treated as a fundamental moral constitutional principle by 
many thousands of Hong Kong residents.
141
 Pro-democracy demonstrations, demands for 
universal suffrage and electoral reform, and even appeals to assistance from Washington D.C. 
and London, evidenced a claim on the part of many protesters that the constitutional morality 
of Hong Kong suffers from a fatal incoherence under the influence of the PRC. This 





 As such protesters were seen to refer to discourses over democracy and other liberal 
constitutional moral principles in their protest dialogue, while the Executive failed to do so 
coherently.
143
 One sees therefore in the Bill, and its protest by the residents of Hong Kong, 
the dynamics of a failed legitimacy claim and a powerful counterclaim by demonstrators. The 
regime cannot on the one hand make appeals to legitimacy based on local democratic-liberal 
constitutional norms, whilst also failing to adhere to those moral imperatives (and making 
appeal instead to the separate constitutional normative system of the PRC), without 
accusations of hypocrisy or moral incoherence.  
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 Two final caveats should be given before the ultimate conclusion is reached. Firstly, 
conceptually one must distinguish two outcomes that were inspired by the anti-Bill protests: 
namely, a) protests and democratic dialogue about broader perceived legitimacy failures, and 
b) violent responses. Despite coverage equating the two as synonymous, with wider protest 
participation being considered conceptually inseparable to opportunistic and unprincipled 
rioting, the Bill was not merely a catalyst for escalating protest violence.
144
 It was a 
microcosm of a much more fundamental normative conflict between the liberal democratic 
constitutional morality aspired to within the Basic Law, and the superordinate normative 
regime of the PRC. A similar process might – very broadly – be observed with relation to the 
gilets jaunes protests in France extending beyond demonstration against fuel duties, and into 
a wider protest dialogue against neoliberal governance and socioeconomic inequalities.
145
 In 
both cases, it is important not to conflate falsely the widening of legitimacy-claim critiques 
with widening protest violence: they may correlate but they are conceptually distinct. With 
relation to Hong Kong, the anti-Bill protests were inevitably going to highlight the 
constitutional morality dichotomy underpinning the region. It was these dichotomies and 
deficits that led to the drafting of the Bill in the first place. For as long as these distinct 




 The second caveat relates to the very question whether Hong Kong is a “liberal 
democracy” for the purposes of liberal democratic theory. The foregoing demonstrates that 
Hong Kong presents itself and makes claims based on being an autonomous regime. Its 
principles of private property, human rights and due process set it apart from the PRC as a 
liberal regime. It is more contestable whether it meets its aspirations of being a democratic 
regime such as to make coherent claims to obedience from morally autonomous citizens on 
that precise basis.
147
 However, as previously discussed, the Basic Law explicitly codifies 
principles of democratic governance, and liberal principles such as human rights, due 
process, and personal property: principles which enjoy a great deal of support from Hong 
Kong residents. It may well be that the administration of Hong Kong makes separate claims 
to legitimacy founded in a constitutional morality separate and distinct from those of a liberal 
democracy.
148
 However, it does make claims as a democratic, liberal regime, and it does 
present claims to legitimacy and obedience based on these moral claims: with great support 
from its residents who, indeed, wish to see the legitimacy of the regime strengthened by more 
robust democratic participation.
149
 For as long as Hong Kong cites universal suffrage and 
democratic accountability in its constitutional settlement, while failing to live up to these 
principles in practice, it shall do so with the aforementioned axiological difficulties and, 
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VI. Conclusion: continued constitutional incoherence?  
It has been demonstrated that liberal democratic regimes make claims to authority based on 
certain constitutional moral principles. They use these as axioms in legitimacy claims, or 
claims to obedience, from subjects who are otherwise morally autonomous. Hong Kong is 
therefore an interesting case: for either its legitimacy claims are mired in unsolvable 
axiological conflicts regarding its dichotomous constitutional moralities, or it can only make 
claims based on the constitutional morality of the PRC.
150
 In neither case is it clear that the 
government of Hong Kong can claim liberal democratic constitutional moral reasons for 
obedience to its laws.   
 
 It is hoped that this research can help political leaders and activists in Hong Kong to 
convey more clearly the constitutional framing of their competing legitimacy claims, ideally 
with a view to encouraging more peaceful and coherent dialogue. It may also prove 
significant for framing analyses of protests in other jurisdictions, under the heuristics of 
constitutional morality and legitimacy claims, which may assist not only academic 
commentators but also politicians and social movements who hope for clearer, more peaceful 
dialogue with protest movements worldwide.   
 
 Worryingly for Hong Kong, however, the underlying, non-democratic foundations of 
the PRC regime will continue to belie the democratic moral constitutionality to which appeal 
is made regionally. Numerous political factors compound the accusations of illegitimacy. 
Oxfam has reported that income inequality in Hong Kong is at its worst in 45 years: were it a 
sovereign state, it would be amongst the ten most unequal in the world.
151
 Arguably the 
capitalist settlement of Hong Kong was always destined to be limited in its democratic 
aspirations. In a 1988 interview, Milton Friedman suggested that it was indeed imperative 
that universal suffrage and democratic institutions be subordinate to the free market capitalist 
structures of Hong Kong’s laissez-faire governance, for the sake of its ‘economic 
freedom.’
152
 The former Chief Executive, Leung Chun-ying, echoed these sentiments to the 
effect that universal and equal suffrage would allow poorer residents to demand redistributive 




 Given the constitutional crises already seen in its first few decades, it seems inevitable 
that there will be future conflicts between Hong Kong’s regional constitutional settlement and 
the interests of the PRC in the near future. The overwhelming majority of these earlier 
protests – the Umbrella Movement, urban development protests, and more besides – were 
founded upon deeper root issues which will continue to grow beneath the surface.
154
 The 
flawed legitimacy claims of many contentious laws and policies are derived entirely from a 
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 In a 1993 interview with former governor Chris Patten, it was intimated that attempts 
at democratic reform, in the run-up to the handover and the Joint Declaration, were getting 
“nowhere fast” due to the recalcitrance of Beijing.
155
 For some, progress since the handover 
has been similarly torturous. Although these things take time to thoroughly institutionalise, 
under the principle of gradual and orderly progress, attempts to introduce greater democratic 
accountability have been directly impeded by the NPCSC intervention in recent years.
156
 The 
frustrated pace of democratisation has been sorely felt by activists within the protest 
movement, who ask to see the realisation of universal suffrage and the protection of human 
rights soon: just how soon is now a question of extreme importance, given the panic of 
escalating violence throughout 2019. This is without even considering the concerns of a post-
2047 Hong Kong settlement, which will pose even more questions about coherence and the 
sustainability of such claims to democratic legitimacy.
157
 As such we should anticipate that, 
for the foreseeable future, there will continue to be laws which highlight these incoherent 
legitimacy claims, which will betray an incoherent constitutional morality: and these will go 
hand in glove with legitimacy counterclaims by protesters not only on the proposed laws in 
question, but, just as the recent anti-Bill protests have shown, the divisive and divided 
constitutional foundations of Hong Kong itself.  
 
 For any future conflict between the realist approach from the Mainland, and the 
liberal constitutional moral claims made by the Basic Law, as long as protesters make appeals 
to those liberal democratic principles, there will continue to be rational grounds for dissent. 
Either Hong Kong needs to discover another compelling moral constitutional rationale which 
gives good moral reason for obedience, or it must attain greater coherence in its claims as a 
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